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CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IS NOT A
MATTER OF DEGREE
INTRODUCTION
Less than 24 hours after a 30-year-old New York City investment
banker embarked on a routine, stress-relieving jog, the New York Times,
April 21, 1989, newspaper blared: "Youths Rape and Beat Central Park
Jogger."' Her body temperature had dropped to 80 degrees while she lay in
a pool of her own blood.2 She lost three-fourths of her body's blood before
she was found,' nearly four hours after the attempted murder.4 The victim
was raped, punched, kicked, and knifed to unconsciousness.5 Eleven days
after the senseless "wilding" attack, the investment banker regained con-
sciousness with a prognosis of "some permanent brain damage."6
Inevitably, conflicts arise among members of any society.
In cases of conflict, cultures that we choose to call "primitive" deter-
mined who should prevail with sword and club: and there is recent
melancholy evidence that law of the jungle is not yet departed from
the affairs of nations. But in a civilized community, it is the law
which is called upon to act as arbiter.7
The attack on the Central Park jogger raises a number of questions re-
garding a civil tort action for nonpecuniary damages. Is the Central Park
jogger entitled to conscious pain and suffering damages during the eleven
days of unconsciousness? If so, when does the calculation of damages begin
and end? On what factual bases does the claim rest? This Comment will
address these and related questions primarily in light of Wisconsin law, but
1. Wolff, Youths Rape and Beat Central Park Jogger, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at BI, col.
2.
2. Id.
3. Pitt, Jogger's Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 hours, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1989, at Al,
col. 2.
4. Wolff, supra note 1, at B1, col. 2.
5. Sullivan, Doctors Give Jogger Chance of Full Recovery, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1989, at B3,
col. 4.
6. Kolata, Jogger's Outlook Better, Doctors Say, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1989, at B3, col. 4.
A total of six male minors constituted the band of roving outlaws. As a result of video tape
confessions, five of the six defendants were convicted on criminal charges, including attempted
murder. Fifteen year old Steven Lopez, the ring leader and most brutal attacker, was allowed to
plea bargain in late January, 1991, to stealing a radio from another jogger. Lopez was the only
one of the six to refuse to make a statement to investigating detectives. The other defendants
refused to turn state's evidence and stated they would rather go to jail on criminal contempt
charges than risk the wrath of Lopez and his followers. Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at A10, col.1
(Mid. West ed.).
7. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 3, at 16 (1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].
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will also draw upon the laws of other jurisdictions that have explored the
nexus between legal and medical conscious pain and suffering concepts.
Section I of this Comment sets forth the doctrinal basis of nonpecuniary
damages for pain and suffering, as well as the role of the jury and its ex-
pected approach to answering such damage questions. Section II examines
what it means to "experience pain" and "suffering" from pathological and
psychological perspectives. Section III sets forth the physiological under-
pinnings of consciousness as well as the interrelationships between con-
sciousness, pain, and suffering. In addition, Section III discusses the causes
of consciousness suppression and the evaluation of consciousness levels or
levels of awareness in acute and chronic conditions.
Section IV presents an overview of the scope and requirements that
courts have placed on plaintiffs' recovery for conscious pain and suffering
damages. Specifically, this section addresses the approaches used to in-
struct juries on how to calculate pain and suffering awards. This section
also surveys those jurisdictions that have discussed the relationship between
degrees of consciousness or levels of awareness, and degrees of pain. Fi-
nally, Section V sets forth the proposition that, given the existence of cer-
tain facts, a special verdict question concerning conscious pain and suffering
damages should not be presented to the jury as a matter of law. Included in
this discussion are the policy reasons for and against such a proposition.
I. OVERVIEW OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGE AWARDS
The primary purpose of a civil tort action is to compensate the plaintiff,
in the form of compensatory damages,8 for loss or harm sustained as a re-
sult of the negligent conduct of another.' The specific goal of tort law is to
place the injured party in the position that he or she would have been in
absent the wrong.10 Damages awarded to an injured party take the form of
compensatory damages for pecuniary harm, compensatory damages for
8. Compensatory damages are the monies awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity,
or restitution for harm sustained by the claimant. I M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D.
AXELROD, AND R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.02 at 1-6 (1989) [hereinafter 1
M. MINZER].
9. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 2, at 7.
10. 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, § 1.00, at 1-3. The purposes of these damages are to: (1)
provide compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harms; (2) determine rights; (3) punish
wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and (4) vindicate parties and deter retaliations, violence,
and unlawful self-help. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965).
11. Pecuniary damages include harm to property, harm to earning capacity, and the creation
of liabilities such as medical expenses. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 (1979).
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nonpecuniary harm, 12 and punitive damages.13 Given the scope of this
Comment, pecuniary' 4 and punitive 5 damages will not be addressed.
The entire concept of attempting to reposition a plaintiff to his pre-in-
jury status with an economic award for noneconomic damages (pain and
suffering) rests upon a questionable foundation. The precariousness of this
foundation arises in instances where pain and suffering occurs prior to
death'6 or when the plaintiff is unconscious. Pain and suffering are not com-
pensable "in any ordinary sense that they make the plaintiff whole or re-
place what has been lost, since the damages are not pecuniary and since
there is no market in pain and suffering by which the damages could be
estimated."' 7 Nevertheless, the law clearly allows a plaintiff to recover a
12. Id. § 905. Nonpecuniary damages include bodily harm and emotional distress. Id.
Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(a) (1987-88), Limitations in Tort Actions, defines noneconomic dam-
ages as:
Mony [sic] intended to compensate for pain and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment;
worry; mental distress; noneconomic effects of disability including loss of enjoyment of
normal activities, benefits and pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical health, well-
being or bodily functions; loss of consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love
and affection.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Punitive damages are levied against a
person to punish her for outrageous conduct and to deter her and others like her from similar
conduct in the future. Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous because
of the defendant's evil motive or reckless disregard for the rights of others. Id.
14. See generally 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, at Chapter 3; C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES
Chapter 11 (1935); 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 37-55 (1966).
15. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 2, at 9-15; C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 14, §§ 77-85; 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, Chapter 40.
16. The issue of awarding damages in circumstances where pain and suffering are experienced
just prior to death is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Fuchsberg, Damages -
Conscious Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 15 TRIAL LAW. Q. No.3, 1983, at 66; M. JOHNSTON,
THE LAST NINE MINUTES: THE STORY OF FLIGHT 981 (1976); Leebron, Final Moments: Dam-
ages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 280-81 (1989); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Instantaneous Death, or Brief Period of Suffering § 250, at 203 (1988); Perlman, The Crash of
Delta 191: Are the Nightmares Compensable?, 51 J. OF AIR L. CoM. 1037 (1986).
17. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 545 (1973). "Not only can
pain not be measured by a market, it is not to be measured by the 'Golden Rule' either - that is,
the jury is not to be told to award an amount they would personally take to undergo the plaintiff's
injuries." Id. The "Golden Rule" is also known as the "Golden Rule argument," which is most
often employed during counsel's closing argument to the jury. This trial technique, however, is
forbidden in many jurisdictions, including Wisconsin. See Leibl v. St. Mary's Hosp., 57 Wis.2d
227, 230, 203 N.W.2d 715, 717 (1973); see also 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.72; Annotation,
Instructions in a Personal Injury Action Which in Effect, Tell Jurors that in Assessing Damages
They Should Put Themselves in Injured Person's Place, 96 A.L.R.2d 760 (1964); Annotation, Prej-
udicial Effect of Counsel's Argument, in Civil Case, Urging Jurors to Place Themselves in the Posi-
tion of Litigant or to Allow Such Recovery as They Would Wish if in the Same Position, 70
A.L.R.2d 935 (1960).
"The allusion is to the saying attributed to Jesus in the New Testament at Matthew 7:12 and
Luke 6:31: 'As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise'; see Leach v.
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monetary damage award for pain and suffering directly resulting from the
wrongful acts of the tortfeasor.'8 The difficulty in establishing a basis for
estimating the amount of damages has been the source of contention.19
Conceptually, either a subjective or objective approach can be taken in
calculating damages within either a specific category of nonpecuniary loss
or one all-encompassing category.2°
Whether assessment is in relation to a sub-category of loss or
overall damages, three fundamental bases which vary in their objec-
tive and subjective elements or combination of these, and which,
consequently, may be regarded as cutting across an objective/subjec-
tive analysis, have been suggested: the functional approach, the con-
ceptual approach, and the personal approach.21
Under the functional approach, a jury is required to determine damages
based upon the cost of "a reasonable solace for his misfortunes." 22 In other
words, the jury must answer the question: "What would be the cost of a
Metzger, 241 Md. 533, 535, 217 A.2d 302, 303 n.1 (1966); or, in more modem parlance; 'do unto
others as you would have them do unto you'; see Beaumaster v. Crandall, 576 P.2d 988, 994 n.10
(Alaska, 1978)." 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.71, at 293.
18. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 239, at 192 (1988). However, damages can be awarded even
though no impairment of bodily functions results from the tortfeasor's conduct. In some situa-
tions, a jury can award damages when the tortfeasor's act is beneficial to the plaintiff. RESrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comment b, at 456 (1965).
19. See infra notes 137-70 and accompanying text.
20. Somerville, Pain and Suffering at Interfaces of Medicine and Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J.
286, 291 (1986). For example, one large category of damages could be titled "pain and suffering."
Included within this category are the subcategories of physically or mentally oriented harms;
within these subcategories are numerous classifications of injuries. Physically oriented damages
may include physical pain and suffering, aggravation of pre-existing disease, aggravation of a pre-
existing physical condition, impairment of physical ability, disfigurement, dismemberment, loss of
bodily function, inconvenience and discomfort, loss of earning capacity, temporary disability, par-
tial permanent disability, and total permanent disability.
Mentally oriented damages may include mental anguish, impairment of mental ability, fright
or shock, humiliation, indignity or insult, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium (society and
companionship), and worry about future consequences of the injury. THE DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTrrUTE, INC., RESPONSIBLE REFORM No.3, at I1 n. 15 (1972). See generally Lewis, Psychic
Injury: The Many Faces of Pain, 19 TRIAL, July 1983, at 58. But see infra notes 132-36 and
accompanying text concerning the questionable medical distinctions between physical and mental
harm.
21. Somerville, supra note 20, at 291. For example, it is possible to assess loss of enjoyment of
life on a subjective basis and damages for the loss of a limb on an objective basis. Id. Loss of
enjoyment of life injuries are "roughly composed of limitations on life style resulting from physi-
cal or mental injuries proximately caused by the tortfeasor." 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8,
§ 4.12(2), at 27.
22. Somerville, supra note 20, at 291 (citation omitted).
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substitute pleasure for the one no longer made possible due to the loss or
injury?" 23
"When the conceptual approach is used, damages for non-pecuniary
loss are estimated on the objective basis of what a reasonable man's reaction
to the loss the plaintiff has suffered would be in terms of pain and suffering
experienced .... 24 "In comparison, the personal approach takes into ac-
count the plaintiff's subjective reaction to his or her situation of loss and
pain and suffering and tries to estimate in monetary terms what the pain
and suffering merit as damages for 'past, present and future loss of pleasure
and happiness.' "25 It is unclear under which philosophical approach the
Wisconsin civil jury instructions fall.
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction § 1755 on "Past Pain and Suffering"
seems to adhere to the "conceptual approach" in evaluating pain and suffer-
ing. This model instruction states: "What sum of money would fairly and
reasonably compensate [plaintiff] for past pain and suffering he sustained as
a result of the accident."26 This proposed jury instruction essentially seeks
the opinion of the jury as to what it thinks is a reasonable sum of money
that would compensate the plaintiff.
At the same time, the Wisconsin jury instructions on pain and suffering
could be construed to mean that a juror should examine the plaintiff's harm
from the plaintiff's perspective. Pain is largely a subjective experience. 2 In
addition, the plaintiff need not support subjective past pain and suffering
testimony with expert medical testimony.28 Therefore, the jury is left with
no alternative other than to rely on the subjective complaints of the plain-
tiff, resulting in a subjective jury verdict.2 9 The instruction does not explic-
itly state that the jury is to calculate the compensation amount from the
23. Id. "For example, a person who previously enjoyed physical activities, but whose inju-
ries now prevent participation in sport, may be awarded the amount it would cost to install an
expensive sound system in his or her home if this would provide substitute pleasure." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
26. Wis. J. I. Civ. § 1755, Personal Injury: Past Pain and Suffering, 1 (1983).
27. See infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text concerning a medical perspective of pain.
28. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
29. The comment section of the Wis. J. I. Civ. § 1755 offers an expansion upon the meaning
of "pain and suffering" when the loss of enjoyment of life results from the negligence of the
tortfeasor. "When the proof shows curtailment of recreational activities to be of such substantial
nature to warrant special mention, add a phrase to include impairment of his ability to enjoy his
usual pleasurable activities of life." Wis. J. I. Civ. § 1755, Personal Injury: Past Pain and Suffer-
ing, comment, at 2 (1983) (emphasis added). Implicit in this jury instruction comment is a request
of the jury to examine and consider plaintiff's "ability to enjoy his usual pleasurable activities of
life" from the perspective of the plaintiff. Only the plaintiff truly knows what his pleasurable
activities are and to what degree pleasure is derived from those activities.
1991]
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subjective perspective of the plaintiff. However, such an interpretation of
the instruction would be contrary to the "reasonable person" standard upon
which the jury system is based.30
The distinction between subjective and objective approaches to special
verdict questions is not crucial to a just deliberation of pain and suffering
damages when the evidence before the jury consists of both subjective plain-
tiff testimony and objective medical findings. The likelihood of a just delib-
eration, under these circumstances, exists because there is a balance of
subjective and objective evidence from which the jury can draw upon when
reaching its verdict. However, if the evidence at trial consists of a health
care provider's objective observations of the plaintiff, such as moaning,
blinking, and reflexes, coupled with a disagreement between medical experts
as to whether a person experiences pain in a lethargic31 or obtundation32
state of consciousness, such circumstances reintroduce the issue of "objec-
tive v. subjective approaches to verdict questions."33
The focus of this Comment is whether a jury should even consider the
issue of conscious pain and suffering damages when portions of a plaintiff's
nervous system are not fully functioning, yet the plaintiff maintains objec-
tive signs of "consciousness." 34 The following section will examine pain
and suffering from a medical perspective, drawing distinctions between the
evaluation of pain ex post - an acute35 pain circumstance (past pain and
suffering analysis), and an ex ante - a chronic3 6 pain circumstance (future
pain and suffering analysis).
30. See infra notes 159 and accompanying text concerning a discussion of "suggested per
diem amounts" and "per hour compensation" for pain and suffering.
Wis. J. I. Civ. § 1750A, Pain and Future Pain and Suffering; and Disability (1989) contains
nearly identical language as that of Wis. J. I. CIVIL § 1755. Section 1750A reads: "[Wihat sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the pain, suffering, and disability he
sustained as a result of the accident." The instruction also states that the jury should consider in
their deliberation the pain and suffering from the time of the accident "to date and is reasonably
certain to suffer in the future as a consequence of his injuries." Wis. J. I. Civ. § 1750A, Subdivi-
sion 5: Past and Future Pain, Suffering and Disability, 5 (1989).
31. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. "Objective" evidence itself can be misleading and subject to different interpretations by
medical doctors of equally impressive training and skill. See infra notes 111-20 and accompany-
ing text on thermography and note 119 on CAT screening test interpretation.
34. Objective signs of consciousness would include, in part, sleep-wake cycles and reflex re-
sponses to pain stimuli.
35. "Acute" means rapid onset, sharp and severe symptoms of relatively short duration. TA-
BER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 34, 474 (15th ed. 1988) [hereinafter TABER'S].
36. "Chronic" means disease showing little change or of slow progression; long duration. Id.
at 329.
[Vol. 74:289
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II. PAIN AND SUFFERING: A MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Pain
Pain experienced by humans is a complex interrelationship between bio-
logical, psychological, socioeconomic, and cognitive factors.37 Factors that
create the social dimension of pain include parents, education, ethnicity,
financial status, vocational status, and society as a whole.3" The biological
mechanisms of pain include neurons,39 nerve fibers,40 spinal cord,41 brain
stem,42 and the cerebrum or cerebral cortex.43 "Pain is a central rather
37. Brena & Turk, Chronic Pain and Disability: An Overview for Legal Professionals, 54 DEF.
CouNs. J. 122, 123 (1987).
Experiencing pain is influenced by a great number of interacting physical, mental, bio-
chemical, physiologic, psychologic, social, cultural and emotional factors. All of these in-
teractions are dynamic and consistently changing. Thus, the pain that is perceived to be of
a certain intensity or at one time may, at another time, be perceived as being either less or
more intense, even though all other factors appear to be the same.
TABER'S, supra note 35, at 1206.
38. Hirsh, Pain: An Overview, 30 TRAUMA 2:51, 2:63 (1988). For a discussion of the interre-
lationship between pain and intelligence, see generally Woody, The Pain/Intelligence Nexus in
Personal Injury Litigation, 25 MED. J. TECH. Q. 249 (1970).
A comparison of responses between wounded French and British soldiers illustrates the im-
pact that sociological, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds have on the experience of pain. The
French soldier screams, yells, and winces even before a physical examination by the medical care
provider. In contrast, the British soldier is conditioned to be stoic. "Biting his lips produces a
new pain which raises the threshold of the perception of the wound pain. His prior traditional
family and community experiences has [sic] conditioned him to 'bite the bullet.'" 23 AM. JuR.
POF 2D § 3, at 12-13 (1980) (citation omitted).
Other evidence that cultural backgrounds influence acute pain has been demonstrated in
studies which show that four specific ethnic groups, the Italian, Jewish, Irish, and old
English, react to pain in different fashions. The pain threshold that each individual recog-
nizes appears to be uniform among the various groups, but their tolerance to increasing
levels of pain varies. The Italian and Jewish subgroups were not able to tolerate the levels
of electric shock that their Irish or old English counterparts sustained. When Jewish and
Italian members of the investigation were told of this differential finding the pain differen-
tial vanished upon repeat testing. Thus, a specific culture teaches its members to react to
pain in various fashions and to seek help in various ways.
Wise, An Overview of the Phenomenon of Pain, 8 LAw. MED. J. 105, 108-09 (1980) (citation
omitted).
39. A neuron is a nerve whose sole function is to initiate and conduct electrical impulses.
TABER'S, supra note 35, at 1119.
40. Nerve fibers are elongated neurons which form the major portion of the white matter of
the brain, spinal cord and all nerves. Id. at 1111.
41. All nerves to the trunk and limbs pass through the spinal cord. The spinal cord acts as
the center for reflex action and contains the conducting paths to and from the brain. Id. at 1599.
42. The brain stem is a portion of the brain that connects the spinal cord with the cerebral
hemispheres. The brain stem is comprised of the medulla, oblongata, pons, and the mid-brain.
Id. at 226.
43. "The cerebrum is concerned with sensations or the interpretation of sensory impulses;
and all voluntary muscular activities. It is the seat of consciousness and the center of the higher
1991]
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than a peripherally determined event in the nervous system."'  Therefore,
a cut on the bottom of one's foot does not, in and of itself, cause pain. It is
the relationship between the stimulus to the nervous system and the regis-
tration of that stimulus in the brain that causes the experience of pain.
Moreover, the psychological dimension of pain is a fundamental part of
what it means to experience the "sensation of pain."4 Since the experience
of pain is the result of a complex integration of physical, psychological, and
environmental factors, the experience of pain is subjective and cannot be
objectively quantified.'
From a physiological and psychological perspective, pain is a combina-
tion of stimulus, perception, and feeling or emotion. 7 A stimulation must
provide the subject with specific information about the nature of her envi-
ronment.48 The perception component is an interpretation of the stimu-
lus.49 When a stimulus (including those stimuli originating from the body's
senses) registers within the cerebral cortex, the stimulus is felt and a corre-
mental faculties, such as memory, learning, reasoning, judgment, intelligence and emotions." IaK
at 300.
This list is not exhaustive in describing the brain and central nervous system. For a detailed
description of the inner workings of the central nervous system, detailing the transfer of nervous
impulses from the point of stimulation to the mid-brain, see 23 AM. JUR. POF 2D § 3, at 9-14
(1980).
44. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:51.
45. PAIN ANALYSIS: A GUIDE TO DIAGNOSIS 2 (R. Janzen ed. 1970) [hereinafter PAIN
ANALYSIS]. If pain is solely the result of psychological factors, it is referred to as psychogenic
pain. That is, the possibility of anatomical, physiological, and pathological factors as the .-igin of
the sensation of pain are eliminated. In the case of psychogenic pain, the preferred method of
treatment is where "the physician is the medicine." Id. at 1-2.
46. Brena & Turk, supra note 37, at 123. "Pain is always a subjective, psychological state in
the sense that it can only be perceived by the affected individual." Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:51.
47. Interview with Lawrence P. Sullivan, M.D.; certified by the American Board of Psychia-
try and Neurology; Clinical Faculty, Department of Neurology, Medical College of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Staff Neurologist, St. Joseph's Hospital; Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Feb. 2,
1990) [hereinafter Interview with L. Sullivan, M.D.].
Another word to describe the reacting emotion or feeling is "affect," i.e., a mental disposition.
Id. One author, in describing pain in similar terms, stated that pain is a combination of sensation,
feeling, and affect. PAIN ANALYSIS, supra note 45, at 3. However, the difficulty in using the
concept of "sensation" implies an emotional component, a judgment on the part of the patient.
Sensation is very distinct from "pure stimulus." Interview with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47.
"Pain includes not only the perception of an uncomfortable stimulus but also the response to that
perception." TABER'S, supra note 35, at 1301.
48. PAIN ANALYSIS, supra note 45, at 3.
49. Interview with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47. The degree to which stimulation affects
emotions is the conscious phase of pain.
Emotions can either be passions characterized by physical changes in the body (such as an
alteration in respiration rate or changes in muscle tone) or a mental state that is arising as a
subject of reaction, as opposed to a conscious reaction (such as fear, love, anger, or joy). TABER'S,
supra note 35, at 535-36.
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sponding emotion can result.5" This distinction between stimulation and
emotion is crucial to the understanding of pain. The stimulus and emotions
together cause the effect, such as bodily movement away or toward the
stimulus." However, reaction to stimulus can occur devoid of conscious-
ness as in a reflex reaction. 2 Therefore, "[plain is the experience or percep-
tion of the stimuli, not the sensation of the stimuli. One can only experience
pain if he or she can interpret the stimuli and perceive it as pain."'5 3
For example, if a conscious patient with a fully functioning nervous sys-
tem and cerebrum54 were to undergo an amputation of the right leg at the
knee without a general anesthetic, 5 the stimulations sent from the knee to
the brain by way of the nervous system at the commencement of the ampu-
tation would result in pain. Pain exists in this scenario because of the exist-
ence of a stimulus (the incision) causing a sensation (a biochemical impulse
generated at the nerve endings or "pain receptors on the skin")56 that trav-
els from the incision to the cerebrum where it is interpreted, perceived, and
results in a conscious emotional reaction (effect). If this same patient were
to undergo the same surgery under a general anesthetic, sensations of the
operation would still travel from the knee to the cerebrum. However, be-
cause the patient is unconscious, the brain's ability to perceive the stimulus
is eliminated. Regardless of the cause of unconsciousness, be it an anes-
thetic, hypoxia (a deficiency of oxygen supply to the brain),58 or ischemia (a
deprivation of blood supply to the brain),5 9 the brain's ability to perceive
stimuli and subsequently experience pain is prohibited.'
50. Interview with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id. For example, the removal of a finger after touching a hot stove (the reaction) occurs
before the stimulus reaches the cortex, before the perception of that stimulus, and before the
emotional result of "ouchi" Id.
53. Id. "Pain may be defined as the body's awareness of unpleasant changes or activities that
call attention to particular regions of the body. This definition is broad and describes a reaction to
pain, rather than pain itself, the 'feeling' admits of no adequate verbal description." 3 AM. JUR.
POF § 35, at 743 (1959).
54. The cerebrum is the seat of consciousness in the interpreter of sensory impulses. TA-
BER'S, supra note 35, at 300; see also infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of the brain and pain relationship.
55. A general anesthetic is a complete loss of consciousness. TABER'S, supra note 35, at 87.
However, there are numerous types of anesthesia which affect different portions of the brain and
nervous system, resulting in partial or complete loss of sensation with or without loss of con-
sciousness. Id. at 86-88.
56. See PAIN ANALYSIS, supra note 45, at 2.
57. Interview with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47.
58. TABER'S, supra note 35, at 814.
59. Id. at 877.
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the experience of pain requires a stimulus, a feeling or
emotion, and an effect or result. The experience of pain consists of an inter-
mingling of unquantifiable biological, psychological, socioeconomic, and
cognitive factors.
B. Suffering
Suffering, as is the concept of pain, is a subjective experience.61 That is
not to say that "suffering" is not definable. Dr. Yale David Koskoff62 pos-
tulates that "[a]nxiety is at the core of suffering whether due to cancer or
trauma - impact or non-impact trauma. To understand the nature of suf-
fering it becomes necessary to understand the nature of anxiety."63 Psycho-
logical studies which support this proposition identify anxiety, and not the
painful stimuli as the basis of suffering. 6
61. 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.13(lXa).
However, this subjective aspect does not foreclose either the development of objective stan-
dards of evaluation or the ability of others, on the basis of their own experiences, to under-
stand and assess the pain and suffering to which the plaintiff has been, is being, or may in
the future be subjected. The latter, of course, is possible only where the injury alleged, and
the subsidiary issues of causation, extent, and duration, are within the competency of the
trier of fact, considered as an ordinary person.
Id. (citation omitted)
62. As of 1980, Yale David Koskoff, M.D., Ph.D., was a Senior Neurosurgeon at Montefiore
Hospital, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Clinical Associate Professor of Neurology at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh.
63. Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL, July 1977, at 21, 23, reprinted in 8
LAW. MED. J. 207, 210 (1980). Dr. Koskoff relieved intractable pain from several cancer patients
by performing frontal lobotomies (the process of severing the connections between the frontal
lobes of the brain and the thalamus) on his subjects. The severing procedure did not cut any
known pain pathways to the brain. Upon post-surgical examination, "it could be readily demon-
strated that the patient's sensitivity to painful stimulation was unchanged. When asked 'Do you
have pain?' The patients replied 'yes.' Yet, they required no narcotics, whereas prior to surgery as
much as one-half grain of morphine was needed every two to four hours." Y. Koskoff, supra, at
23. The remarkable result of this study was that the patients continued to experience painful
stimuli yet remained unconcerned; the future held no dread. The morphine used as medication
was merely relieving anxiety and not the patients' pain. Id.
64. Koskoff, supra note 63, at 23.
Anxiety is the feeling of uneasiness, often distress derived from the anticipation of dan-
ger. Awareness of helplessness augments anxiety. Unlike fear, which is an emotional re-
sponse to a perceived danger, anxiety is the response to a threat often not recognized.
Unlike fear which is abated when the danger is removed, anxiety persists, becoming
chronic with periods of remission and exacerbation, often for no apparent reason.
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Anxiety manifests itself in a number of ways, including behavioral dis-
orders,65 personality changes associated with chronic somatic disorders,
and depression.66
Depression is the mood disturbance most consistently associated
with anxiety. Depression characterized by apathy, a sense of futility,
and low self worth may reveal itself in the form of explosive anxiety
attacks.... Because of the almost inevitable presence of depression
with anxiety, they may be considered for our purposes a composite
entity - anxiety/depression. [Therefore,] [s]uffering is a mood in
which anxiety/ depression predominates. There is no suffering with-
out anxiety/depression.67
Dr. Koskoff suggests that the reticular formation,6" which is the central
core of tissue in the brain, is the neurophysiological location of suffering
processes. Since the reticular formation has connections to the hypotha-
lamic structures, which are the centers for the body's autonomic function,
stimuli coming into the reticular formation may have emotional character-
istics.69 Such stimuli would include the "uneasiness" distress associated
with anxiety/depression. Thus, the brain's processing centers work as if
they were a network of computers that share information to produce the
result of suffering.70
In short, a vicious cycle exists between pain and suffering. "Pain" and
"suffering" are interdependent concepts: prolonged suffering will produce
65. The behavioral [disorder] patterns of anxiety may be categorized in accordance with
the degree of distress: (1) alertness, akin to vigilance in animals; (2) apprehension resulting
from anticipation of a stressful experience with many of the symptoms described above; (3)
"face" anxiety previously noted; and (4) panic, catastrophic anxiety attacks characterized
by unrealistic behavior, fatigue states with impaired consciousness and visceral dysfunc-




68. The reticular formation " 'awakens the brain to consciousness and keeps it alert; it directs
the traffic of messages in the nervous system; it monitors the myriads of stimuli that beat upon our
senses, accepting what we need to perceive and rejecting what is irrelevant; it tempers and refines
our muscular activity and bodily movements.'" Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
Thus, bits of information brought to the computer are capable of sending messages to
stations responsible for the affective content of the message, to the cerebral cortex where
attention is maintained or heightened and where thought is made possible. Integration with
other stations will involve the motor and vegetative activity described as patterns of suffer-
ing, which are the external manifestations of suffering.
Id. at 24.
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physical symptoms in the form of pain, which in turn augments additional
suffering.71
III. CONSCIOUSNESS/AWARENESS AS IT RELATES
TO PAIN AND SUFFERING
To satisfactorily define consciousness is to exceed the existing medical
and philosophical understanding of human beings.72 In a general sense,
consciousness has been defined as an awareness of self or of the surrounding
environment.73 At the heart of "personhood," as offered by two authors,
are the moral, legal, and constitutional standards of consciousness.74 This
71. Id. Dr. Koskoff makes the following distinctions between pain and suffering:
1. Pain as a result of impact is experienced by all (for the most part) to the same
degree under given circumstances depending on the nature and extent of bodily injury.
2. Pain experience does not vary significantly with the vulnerability of an individual
in his life situation - nor with his adaptive capacities.
3. Suffering takes time to develop, except for the brief periods following unsustained
painful trauma - and then suffering is minimal.
4. Suffering depends on the "memory" capacity of the nervous system.
5. Suffering is experienced to a different degree in different people following similar
traumatic situations.
6. Suffering depends to a greater degree and with greater frequency on the circum-
stances of the trauma which may be without physical impact.
7. Suffering will vary in accordance with the patients' vulnerability in his life situation
and his adaptive capacities. In this light suffering may be considered an exacerbation of
pre-existing anxiety/depression to the degree that it interferes with the person's life-in-
action.
8. Prolonged suffering will produce symptoms as one of the adverse effects of body
function. Such maladaptive disturbances will augment suffering.
Id.
72. Cranford & Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral & (Constitutional) Standard
for Human Personhood, 8 J. op L. & MED. 233, 237 (1987) (the Cranford and Smith article
addresses the essence of human personhood as it relates to individuals in a persistent vegetative
state (PVS)). Persons in a PVS are awake but not aware of their environment; they have an eyes-
open unconsciousness. Id.
73. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts
Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Feb./Mar. 1988, at 28. Consciousness has also been de-
fined as:
A state of awareness. It implies an orientation to time, place, and person, i.e., the individ-
ual knows approximately the date, the nature of the environment, name and other perti-
nent personal data. The content of consciousness is a composite of memories and the
comprehension of external reality; the emotional status and the individual's goals also
enter. It is, then, a large part of what is described as "personality" in its largest sense.
TABER'S, supra note 35, at 373.
74. Cranford & Smith, supra note 72, at 233.
In our view, consciousness is the most important characteristic that distinguishes humans
from other forms of animal life, going beyond the vegetative functions of heartbeat and
respiration. Thus, we believe that the permanent loss of all consciousness is just as signifi-
cant as the loss of all cardiopulmonary functions (the cardiopulmonary standard for death)
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subsection will briefly address the physiological underpinnings of conscious-
ness and the methods of pain and consciousness assessment in acute and
chronic pain circumstances.
The anatomical basis of consciousness is divided into two regions: the
cerebral hemispheres and the reticular formation within the brain stem."
The cerebral hemispheres are the basis of human intellectual existence and
are the centers for awareness of self and environment.76 The reticular for-
mation provides the nervous system with crude stimuli information
originating from our senses." The cerebral hemispheres, namely the cere-
bral cortex, and the reticular formation, work together to create a conscious
state of mind.7" "It is a fundamental fact of neuroanatomy and neurophysi-
ology that consciousness and the capacity to experience pain and suffering
are functions of the neocortex.
79
Absent cerebral functions, a fully functioning brain stem and reticular
formation within the brain stem are capable of supporting a vegetative
state.s° "In contrast, the cerebral hemispheres cannot function in the ab-
and all brain functions (the neurological standard for death), in determining the moral and
legal status of a human being.
Id.
75. A. REEVES, E. VALENSTEIN, J. OCHOA & J. WOODFORD, DISORDERS OF THE NERVOUS
SySTMN 210 (1981) [hereinafter A. REEVES]. Each cerebral hemisphere consists of three parts:
olfactory lobe (rhinencephalon), corpus striatum, and the cerebral cortex (pallium). TABER'S,
supra note 35, at 299. The brain stem is "the stem like part of the brain that connects the cerebral
hemispheres with the spinal cord. Comprises the medulla oblongata, the pans, and the midbrain."
Id. at 226. The reticular formation is groups of cells and fibers that network throughout the brain
stem. This network is "important in controlling or influencing alertness, waking, sleeping, and
various reflexes." Id. at 1481.
76. A. REEVES, supra note 75, at 210.
77. Koskoff, supra note 63, at 23. The reticular formation monitors the myriad of stimulation
originating from our senses, accepting what is necessary for purposes of formulation perceptions
and rejecting that which is irrelevant. In addition, the reticular formation connects with the hypo-
thalamic structures (centers for autonomic system functions) to temper and refine our muscular
activity and body movements. Id.
78. See generally A. REEVES, supra note 75; Koskoff, supra note 63.
79. Cranford & Smith, supra note 72, at 237. The neocortex is a part of the cerebral cortex.
TABER'S, supra note 35, at 1105-06.
80. A. REEVES, supra note 75, at 210.
[I]n cases of patients in a persistent vegetative state, the brain stem, including the ascend-
ing reticular activating system, is relatively intact. The brunt of neurological destruction is
located in the cerebral hemispheres. This state often results when a patient suffers a car-
diac or respiratory arrest with lack of blood flow (ischemia) or oxygen (hypoxia) to the
brain for a matter of minutes. The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain most vulnerable
to this deprivation because of its high metabolic rate, requiring a constant supply of oxy-
gen, glucose, and blood. The brain stem, however, is fairly resistant to ischemia or hyp-
oxia. It is commonly accepted in medicine that approximately four to six minutes of
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sence of reticular activation.""1 Loss of the reticular formation's functions
will terminate all perceiving capabilities of the cerebrum and prohibit the
experience of pain. 2
A. Ex Post Analysis of Acute Conscious Pain and Suffering
Pain and suffering can be analyzed before (ex ante), after (ex post), or
during the actual pain experience.8 3 In proving past pain and suffering, ex
post reliance on the plaintiff's memory and medical records helps prove the
existence of pain and the degree of pain experienced. In determining
whether pain exists in the first instance, the patient's level of consciousness
must be examined. Hence, an acute" analysis of conscious pain and suffer-
ing occurs before the patient/plaintiff's condition has stabilized."5
There are two basic causes of the depression or suppression of con-
sciousness: (1) brain stem reticular formation functional depression; and (2)
bilateral cerebral depression and brain stem reticular depression together.
8 6
Both the cerebral hemispheres and brain stem are affected in the second set
of circumstances; however in the first instance, only the brain stem is af-
fected. The distinction between these two causes and an understanding of
their pathological processes 7 should be observable to the treating physi-
cian.88 Through these observations, the physician should be able to classify
the patient's level of consciousness according to one of four categories (ex-
cluding awakeness): (1) persistent drowsiness, existing when strong exter-
nal stimulation is lacking (this strong stimulation would otherwise induce
awakeness); 9 (2) deep stupor, demanding noxious (or extreme) stimulation
to reach a level of depressed but appropriate responsiveness such as with-
complete loss of blood flow or oxygen to the brain can result in extensive destruction of the
cerebral cortex while relatively sparing the brain stem.
Cranford, supra note 73, at 27-28.
81. A. REEVES, supra note 75, at 210.
82. Id.
83. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 256, 287 (1989).
84. Acute means rapid onset, sharp and severe symptoms of relatively short duration. TA-
BER'S, supra note 35, at 34 & 474.
85. See generally Leebron, supra note 83, at 270-88.
86. A. REEVES, supra note 75, at 213.
87. Pathological processes are bodily function changes produced by disease. TABER'S, supra
note 35, at 1241.
88. A. REEVES, supra note 75, at 213. Physician observations of the patient's neurologic
functions should consist of: "(1) level of consciousness itself, (2) respiratory rate and pattern, (3)
pupillary function, (4) oculomotor - vestibular function, and (5) motor function." Id.
89. Id. At a persistent drowsiness level, the upper diencephalon is affected. Id. The dien-
cephalon is, in part, the center for appreciation of primitive sensations of pain, crude touch, and
temperature. TABER'S, supra note 35, at 462, 1716.
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drawal from stimulus or feeble attempts to remove stimulus;9° (3) "light
coma, noxious stimulation causing only reflex motor response (i.e., decorti-
cate or decerebrate posturing...);,, 91 and (4) deep coma, which exists when
there is no response to noxious stimulation. 92
A consensus on consciousness classification and its definitions does not
exist among neurophysiology experts. Other methods of evaluating con-
sciousness in acute (short-term) instances include the Glasgow Coma
Scale 93 and Dr. Plum and Dr. Posner's monograph on coma.94
It is important to recognize that the various levels of consciousness dis-
cussed above are pathologically induced. The level of consciousness falling
below "alert wakefulness" is a condition produced by disease or abnormal
body states. 9" In contrast, "[s]leep is a nonpathologic depression of con-
sciousness from which the subject can be aroused to persistent alert wake-
fulness with appropriate noxious stimui.' 96
In instances where noxious stimuli are applied to subjects with patho-
logically reduced consciousnesses, such stimuli generally will shift the sub-
jects' consciousnesses up one level.97 Noxious stimuli can also take the
90. A. REEvEs, supra note 75, at 213. In a deep stupor, the lower diencephalon is affected.
Noxious stimuli can take a variety of forms to illicit behavior in stuporous or comatose patients.
"Most entail tissue-damaging maneuvers such as forcefully compressing a firm object such as a
pen against the fingernail bed, pinching a nipple or testicle, or compressing the supraorbital nerve.
More aesthetic and usually more effective is irritation of the nares with a cotton wisp."
91. Id. In a light coma, the upper mesencephalon (midbrain) is effected. Id.
92. Id.
93. The Glasgow Coma Scale is a scale of three to fifteen for evaluating and quantitating the
degree of coma by determining the best motor, verbal, and eye-opening responses to standardized
stimuli. Coma is diagnosed by absence of motor and verbal responses and eye-opening. A score
of 7 or less is classed as coma when this scale is used. A score of 9 or greater excludes the
diagnosis of coma. TABER'S, supra note 73, at 684.
94. W. PRYSE-PHILLIPS & T. MURRAY, ESSENTIAL NEUROLOGY 66 (1978).
There are many loose and meaningless terms used to describe changes in consciousness,
the most vague being the commonly used semi-conscious which has no specific meaning at
all. The terms used by Plum and Posner in their excellent monograph on coma are: Alert
wakefulness: The patient responds immediately, fully and appropriately to all stimuli.
Lethargy: a state of drowsiness, inaction or indifference with delayed or incomplete re-
sponses; increased stimulation may be needed to get a response. Obtundation: an even
duller state in which the patient maintains his wakefulness but little more. Stupor: a state
in which the patient can be aroused only by vigorous stimuli. Coma: a state in which the
psychological and motor responses and reflexes are lost altogether.
Id.
95. TABER'S, supra note 35, at 474.
96. A. REEvEs, supra note 75, at 211. "Sleep appears to be an active and reversible suppres-
sion of reticular arousal." Id.
97. W. PRYSE-PHILLIPS & T. MURRAY, supra note 94, at 66.
As a working rule it may be stated that, except in the case of deep coma, each of the other
categories can be 'shifted up' one level with adequate stimulation. In deep coma there will
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form of tissue injuries, as in an automobile accident. 98 In Helleckson v.
Loiselle,99 the plaintiff suffered injuries that prevented him from restful
sleep."oc The hospital medical records indicated that the plaintiff was rest-
less and experienced only intermittent sleep "'because he had so much
pain.' "101 Given the facts of this case, it would be reasonable to conclude
that the stimuli (tissue injuries) within this plaintiff shifted his conscious-
ness level between persistent drowsiness and wakefulness. When the nox-
ious stimuli were strong enough, the plaintiff would awaken from his
pathologically depressed consciousness, at which time he experienced con-
scious pain and suffering.1"2 To a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
pain cannot be experienced at the "persistent drowsiness" state because
only strong noxious stimuli can elicit motor activity or arousal of the pa-
tient. 1 3 In the absence of these strong stimuli, the patient does not experi-
ence pain.' 4
B. Ex Ante Analysis of Chronic Conscious Pain and Suffering
In addition to evaluating conscious pain and suffering in an ex post cir-
cumstance, an ex ante analysis is used to determine future pain and suffer-
ing. An ex ante evaluation is conducted when a patient has a stabilized
medical condition so that a reasonable degree of medical certainty of future
pain and suffering can be ascertained. Inherent in the patient's medical sta-
bilization is a fixed consciousness level.' 05 Therefore, no debate exists over
be no response by the patient to any form of stimulations, while in light coma, restlessness
or semi-purposive movements such as grunting or arm or leg avoidance movements may
occur if unpleasant stimuli are given.
In stupor, the patient will not speak, but the drowsy patient will be more or less able to
understand and make himself understood. A single recording of conscious level is almost
valueless and repeated charting is necessary so that one is able to comprehend the progress
of the disease.
Id.; see also interview with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47.
98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text concerning noxious stimuli.
99. 37 Wis. 2d 423, 155 N.W.2d 45 (1967).
100. Id. at 428, 155 N.W.2d at 49.
101. Id.
102. The use of this case is for illustrative purposes only. The author does not intend to read
into the record those facts which do not exist or are unknown. The actual determination of con-
sciousness and the experience of pain hinges upon whether the upper diencephalon (center of
crude stimulus processing) is damaged. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also inter-
view with L. Sullivan, M.D., supra note 47.




1991] CONSCIOUS PAIN & SUFFERING
whether a patient in a chronic' °6 medical condition experiences "conscious
pain and suffering." ' 7
The scope of this Comment does not extend to issues of chronic pain
and suffering nor to coma and persistent vegetative state levels of conscious-
ness. l"' However, medical evaluations of persons in states of permanent
unconsciousness can provide objective evidence as to the extent of tissue
damage to the cerebral cortex and brain stem. 9 Such objective medical
tests can also be used to evaluate patients in an acute medical condition.110
An increasingly popular medical diagnostic test used in the courtroom
as evidence of pain is Infrared Imaging Thermography (thermography)."'
Thermography is an objective illustration of the physiologic equivalence of
pain via a multi-colored picture of the body's skin surface.' 2 The human
106. Chronic means disease showing little change or of slow progression; long duration. TA-
BER'S, supra note 35, at 329.
107. See generally Cranford, supra note 73; Leebron, supra note 83, at 270-88.
108. There are three major clinical types of permanently unconscious patients. The first,
the prototype for this category, consists of those patients in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS) [citation omitted.] Patients in this condition have an eyes-opened unconsciousness.
They are awake, but unaware. The eyes are open at times, during periods of normal wake-
fulness, and they have physiologic sleep/wake cycles which are readily apparent to observ-
ers. The damage in these patients is to the higher centers of the brain (the cerebral
hemispheres), more specifically to the neocortex, while the lower centers of the brain, the
brain stem, are relatively intact....
In contrast to the vegetative state, coma is an eyes-closed unconsciousness. In these
patients, there is extensive damage to the brain stem.... Thus, it can be said that patients
in a true coma are "terminally ill;" with a high degree of probability, these patients will
usually die within a period of weeks or months - rarely years....
The third clinical category for permanently unconscious patients consists of anencephalic
infants. Anencephalic infants. Anencephali is a severe congenital malformation in which
the infant has essentially no cerebral hemispheres, but retains a variable amount of func-
tioning brain stem.
Cranford & Smith, supra note 72, at 237-38. See generally Cranford, Life, Death, Awareness and
Suffering, 11 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILrrY: Bus., JOURNALISM, LAW AND MED. 41 (1986); Cranford,
supra note 73; Jennett & Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage, 1 LANcET 734-37
(1972).
109. Cranford, supra note 73, at 29.
110. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:103. "Objective evidence of pain has always been difficult to
demonstrate." Id. It is very difficult to determine whether pain exists at all and if it does, its
intensity is difficult to prove because that pain is subjective. Id.
111. The following states have allowed thermography into evidence at trial: California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois; Louisiana, see Blanchard v. A-1 Bit and Tool Co., Inc., 406 So.
2d 773 (La. App. 1981); Michigan, see Karaskiewicz v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 126 Mich.
App. 103, 336 N.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1983); Mississippi, see Tribou v. Gunn, 410 So. 2d 378
(1982); New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, see Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp.,
99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981). See generally, Newman, Newman, & Newman, Infrared
Imaging Thermography: Medical Diagnostic and Legal Evidentiary Rule Value, 13 LEGAL As-
PECTS OF MED. PRAC., Mar. 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Newman].
112. Newman, supra note 111, at 1.
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body emits symmetrical heat patterns in the absence of tissue damage or
trauma.1 13 "Any pressure or irritation on a nerve root or peripheral nerve
fiber can produce changes thought... [to result in a] vasoconstriction [nar-
rowing of blood vessels] and, therefore, decreased heat emission along the
course of the nerve or nerve root affected."'1 14 These variations in skin tem-
perature are then registered on thermograms.
"Thermography's most practical applications have been in diagnostic
screening for neurologic, musculoskeletal, and soft-tissue damage, such as
nerve root irritation, peripheral nerve injury, reflex sympathetic dystrophy,
and musculoskeletal soft-tissue syndromes."' 15 From a legal perspective,
thermography provides a partial picture of objective manifestations of sub-
jective pain, thus helping to prove the existence or absence of pain.I 6 How-
ever, thermographies are not meant to take the place of other neurologic or
orthopedic examinations." 7 The key to the successful use of thermography
is the corroboration of its findings with findings from other tests such as
electromyography (EMG),115 computerized axial tomography (CAT)
scans,119 and myelograms.120
113. Uricchio, Electronic Thermography in Orthopedic Practice, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
179, 180 (1987).
114. Id. This Comment author merely intends to give a general overview of thermography.
For a more in-depth discussion of thermography uses in law and medicine, see generally Archer &
Zinn, Thermogram: Persuasive Tools in Soft-Tissue Injury Cases, 19 TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 68; Ness
& Ness, Thermography: Its Legal Implications, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 162 (1987); Newman,
supra note 111; Rein, Thernography: Medical and Legal Implications, 13 LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MED. PRAC., Mar. 1985, at 4; Uricchio, Electronic Thermography in Medical Practice, 13 LEGAL
ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC., Apr. 1985, at 1; Uricchio, supra note 113; and Hirsh, supra note 38.
115. Uricchio, supra note 114, at 1.
116. Ness & Ness, supra note 114, at 167. "Before the plaintiff or defense claim thermogra-
phy as their tool, both must understand that it can be a double-edged sword. It may confirm a
diagnosis, but it also may help to weed out the malingerers." Newman, supra note 111, at 3.
Three fundamental questions now can be answered objectively using thermography: (1)
Is there physiologic nerve-fiber involvement? (2) Is there substantial soft-tissue injury? (3)
Is there a reason for the pain? When the answer to any of these is affirmative, treating
doctors can improve the quality of their evaluations and the medical management of their
patients. In addition, lawyers can better judge how vigorously to proceed. If the answers
to these questions are all negative, injuries may be considered less severe.
Rein, supra note 114, at 4.
117. Uricchio, supra note 113, at 189.
118. An EMG is a "graphic record of the contraction of a muscle as a result of electrical
stimulation." TABER'S, supra note 35, at 527-28.
119. CAT scans are a precise reconstruction of body structure by use of a radiographic beam
and have been most successful in diagnostic studies of the brain. Id. at 1744. "CAT ... scanning
will show extensive structural damage to the cerebral hemispheres consistent with the clinical
diagnosis, but these studies are not quantifiable." Cranford, supra note 73, at 30.
120. Myelography is the "[r]oentgenographic inspection of the spinal cord by use of a radio-
paque medium injected into the intrathecal space." TABER'S, supra note 73 at 1085; see also
[Vol. 74:289
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There are other objective tests available to determine the degree of nor-
malcy for body structures in either acute or chronic medical conditions.
Such tests include electroencephalography (EEG),"' magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), 22 single photon emissions computerized tomography
(SPECT),123 and positron emissions tomography (PET). 124 These tests can
be helpful in supporting or denying the existence of pain and determining
whether the patient is capable of experiencing pain in the first instance.1 2s
Nevertheless, the experience of pain is always subjective because pain is
based, in part, upon one's conscious perception of a stimulus. 1 26 The pres-
ence or absence of a pathophysiologic cause as demonstrated through medi-
cal testing is not a guarantee that subjective complaints of pain are real or
fabricated.1 27
IV. LEGAL TREATMENT OF "CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING"
DAMAGES
A. Overview
As discussed in earlier portions of this Comment, there are no clear
delineations between "pain" and "suffering." "The phrase 'pain and suffer-
ing' has been used generically to encompass a number of injury concepts,
ranging from physical pain to anxiety and depression and the resulting con-
Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:109. For example, when thermography and EMG test results are cor-
roborated, the diagnosis of spinal nerve involvement is 92 percent accurate.
121. EEG is an "[a]mplification, recording, and analysis of the electrical activity of the
brain." TABER'S, supra note 35, at 524.
122. MRI is an imaging technique that uses magnetism and radio waves to produce images
that are more sensitive and contain more information than a CAT (CT) scan. Lyfkin, Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Central Nervous System: Interpretation and Normal Anatomy, 6 SEMI-
NARS IN NEUROLOGY, Mar. 1986, at 1.
123. SPECT or SPET is frequently referred to as the "poor man's PET test." The process is
cheaper and easier to complete, yet the degree of imagery is less precise. Frackowiak, A Short
Introduction to Positron Emission Tomography, 9 SEMINARS IN NEUROLOGY, Dec. 1989, at 277-
78.
124. [The PET] test measures in a quantitative fashion the metabolic rates of glucose and
oxygen in various parts of the brain, including the cerebral cortex, an important index
since consciousness cannot be sustained below certain quantifiable levels of metabolism....
However, PET scanning is new and extremely expensive; only a few centers in the country
currently have the equipment necessary to carry out PET scanning. Furthermore, there is
not yet sufficient data to document unequivocally the value of this test in the diagnosis of
the persistent vegetative state.
Cranford, supra note 73, at 30. Note that the PET test results were used as evidence in In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:51; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
127. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:51.
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sequences on the injured person's life style."' 28 In short, "[c]ourts have not
attempted to draw distinctions between the elements of 'pain' on the one
hand, and 'suffering' on the other."' 29 The actual meaning of each individ-
ual word becomes less important when one recognizes that the "unitary
concept of 'pain and suffering' has served as a convenient label under which
a plaintiff may recover not only for physical pain but for fright, nervous-
ness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity,
embarrassment, apprehension, terror, or ordeal."' 30
Pain itself can be distinguished between mental or psychogenic pain and
physical or organic pain.' The realities of medicine indicate that a "physi-
cian is not always able to partition organic factors from psychological vari-
ables, since psychogenic pain almost always has an organic psychological
128. 1 M. MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.11(1), at 4-20. "Traumatic (psycho)neurosis is a fa-
vored designation in American law under which varieties of pain and suffering states are sub-
sumed." Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:99.
129. 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages § 239, at 240 (1988). Nevertheless, some legal and medical
experts believe that it is prudent to present to the jury pain and suffering as separate items of
damages. Reducing general pain and suffering damages into separate elements facilitates jury
understanding of complex medical issues. Moreover, a failure to build a solid factual foundation
under both pain and suffering damages can be disregarded by the defense (and correspondingly
the jury) with the argument that such pain or suffering is a "functional overlay," which implies
malingering. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2:99.
130. 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages § 240 (1988). The concept of "pain and suffering" also "cov-
ers disfigurement and deformity, impairment of ability to work or labor, anxiety or worry proxi-
mately attributable to an injury, and mental distress caused by impairment of the enjoyment of
life." Id. But see 23 AM. JUR. POF 2D § 4, at 14-15 (1980) (discussing compensation for suffering
without the experience of pain (relying on Peck, Fourdyce and Black, The Effect of the Pendency
of Claims for Compensation Upon Behavior Indicative of Pain, 53 WAsH. L. REv. 251 (1978))).
131. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. What appears to be one of the earliest
court recognitions of a plaintiff's entitlement to both physical and mental suffering in Wisconsin
was outlined in Stutz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 73 Wis. 147, 40 N.W. 653 (1888). In this case,
a female passenger was instructed to exit the train several hundred feet from the depot platform.
In order for the plaintiff to reach the highway, it was necessary for her to walk along the tracks
until they intersected with the highway. The night was dark and she was carrying bundles in her
hands. Id. at 148, 40 N.W. at 653-54. As she proceeded down the track, she fell down into a
trench beneath the tracks used by cattle to cross underneath the tracks. After injuring her knee,
she attempted to climb out of the culvert. At this time, trains were switched to the track that
traveled directly over the open culvert and began to move towards the plaintiff. The woman
became greatly excited and frightened by their approach. Id. at 149, 40 N.W. at 654-55.
The following jury instruction, on appeal, was found to be within the confines of Wisconsin
tort law by the supreme court:
She is entitled to such amount of damages as in your judgment, will compensate her for all
the physical injuries directly resulting from the negligence complained of, as well as the
mental suffering resulting therefrom.... The plaintiff, if she is entitled to recover, is
entitled to full compensatory damages for all the direct physical injury, as well as the
mental suffering, you may find from, the evidence, resulted from the injury caused by the
negligence complained of.
Id. at 151, 40 N.W. at 654.
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component whereas organic pain is never without emotional reaction." 132
It is therefore not surprising that the legal profession has not developed any
of its own models to differentiate between "mental" and "physical"
damages.
133
Given our current medical understanding of pain, a distinction between
physical pain and mental pain is misleading.134 "Physical refers to the ana-
tomical site and origin of the pain. The term takes no cognizance of the fact
that pain, like all other perceptions, regardless of its 'physical' origins, is
ultimately 'mental.' "'"" One author purports that the search for the
"cause" of pain, where numerous medical disciplines are asked to dissect
medical complexities that are not fully realized, is fueled by the very nature
of our adversarial legal system. 136
B. Proving and Calculating Pain and Suffering
As early as 1947, The Wisconsin Supreme Court sought to quantify fu-
ture pain and suffering by requiring that a plaintiff's claim for damages be
supported by competent proof. In Wenneman v. Royal Indemnity Co.,137
the court held that the plaintiff's award for future pain and suffering as a
result of an automobile accident lacked sufficient evidence since the jury's
132. Hirsh, supra note 38, at 2: 53; see also supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion concerning the interaction between stimuli and emotional reaction as a necessary com-
ponent of the experience of pain.
133. Koskoff, supra note 63, at 21, 22. Any cursory legal research of pain will show that
most sources will make distinctions between mental and physical damages. See, eg., I M.
MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.11(2) Physical Pain, § 4.11(3) Mental Suffering; 22 AM. JUR. 2d supra
note 18, §§ 251-261.
The concept of "mental suffering" is nearly synonymous with that of "mental anguish" and
"emotional distress" as defined by case law. However, in a practical sense, "mental anguish" and
"emotional distress" appear to be associated with the cases in which mental harm is the principle
injury for which relief is sought. In contrast, "mental suffering" appears to be confined to cases
where the harm arises out of or naturally follows from a physical pain or injury. "Thus, the
concepts can be distinguished on the basis of their operational definitions. Mental anguish can be
characterized as 'unpleasant mental sequelae' - such as worry, concern, grief, humiliation, em-
barrassment, and depression - 'which are not directly related to pain sensations.'" 1 M.
MINZER, supra note 8, § 4.11(4).
134. Koskoff, supra note 63, at 22.
135. Id.; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text concerning a medical perspective of
the organic and psychogenic dimensions of pain.
136. Brena & Turk, supra note 37, at 125. The ultimate victim in this search for a cause-
harm linkage is the plaintiff/patient himself. "Both groups of professionals [physicians and attor-
neys] do not realize that prolonged, repetitive diagnostic investigation often carried along through
multiple physicians across various medical specialties, is in itself a major stressor, likely to further
decompensate a pain patient into a maladaptive CPS [chronic pain sufferer] that is too often not
recognized." Id. (citation omitted).
137. 251 Wis. 630, 30 N.W.2d 250 (1947).
MARQUETE LAW REVIEW
award was based upon the unsupported subjective statements of the plain-
tiff.138 "In the absence of sufficient competent proof in that respect, the
award in question cannot be sustained, and any attempt by the court to
assess the proper amount would be dependent largely upon mere
conjecture." 1 39
The supreme court added to the Wenneman guidelines for jury calcula-
tions of future pain and suffering in the case of Diemel v. Weirich.14' In this
case the court held that:
[o]nly a medical expert is qualified to express an opinion to a medi-
cal certainty... as to whether the pain will continue in the future,
and, if so, for how long a period it will so continue. In the absence of
such expert testimony... the jury should be instructed that no dam-
ages may be allowed for future pain and suffering. 141
However, in Drexler v. All American Life & Casualty Co., 42 the court
modified the requirement that an expert testify at trial as to the existence of
the plaintiff's current or past pain and suffering.1 43 "In general, expert tes-
timony is not required to support a jury's finding of fact unless the subject
matter involved is outside the realm of the ordinary experience of mankind
and requires special learning, study and experience."'" The jury is entitled
to believe the claimant even in the absence of objective evidence which may
account for his pain.145
The court modified the principles outlined in Diemel by altering the
plaintiff's burden in proving pain and suffering damages through expert tes-
138. Id. at 634, 30 N.W.2d at 252.
139. Id. at 634-35, 30 N.W.2d at 252; see also Wasicek v. M. Carpenter Baking Co., 179 Wis.
274, 278, 191 N.W. 503, 504 (1923) ("There is no accurate scale by which either court or jury can
determine damages for pain and suffering.") GHIARDI, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN Wis-
CONSIN 72 (1964).
140. 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
141. Id. at 268-69, 58 N.W.2d at 652-53. The court also stated that the general rule in Wis-
consin regarding proof of pain and suffering damages was best articulated as:
[W]here the injury is subjective in character and of such nature that a layman cannot with
reasonable certainty know whether or not there will be future pain and suffering, the courts
generally require the introduction of competent expert opinion testimony bearing upon the
permanency of such injury or the likelihood that the injured person will endure future pain
and suffering before allowing recovery therefor.
Id., 58 N.W.2d at 652 (citation omitted).
142. 72 Wis. 2d 420, 241 N.W.2d 401 (1976).
143. Id. at 428, 241 N.W.2d at 406.
144. Id. (citing Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971);
Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969); Pollock v.
Pollock, 273 Wis. 233, 77 N.W.2d 485 (1956)); see also Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d
823 (1989) (medical expert testimony is not required to establish conscious pain and suffering).
145. Drexler, 72 Wis. 2d at 428, 241 N.W.2d at 406.
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timony. Courts originally required the jury to reach its decision concerning
pain and suffering with "reasonable certainty." '146 Now the standard for the
jury's award is an "ordinary experience of mankind" when the understand-
ing of the alleged pain and suffering does not require "special learning,
study and experience." 47 This change in emphasis of the trier of fact's
approach to damages follows an historical trend in Wisconsin that allows
the jury greater deference in its deliberation on damages.1 4
The Drexler court also appeared to limit the required use of a medical
expert to only address the "existence" of "current or past" pain and stated
that an expert "may express an opinion" as to the type of pain experienced,
i.e., real, imaginary, or feigned.1 49 The court leaves open, perhaps inten-
tionally, whether an expert opinion is required to prove future pain and
suffering as well as degrees of suffering.150
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also stated that when a jury is given
the responsibility for calculating conscious pain and suffering damages,
such damages cannot be calculated by use of an hourly formula. 51 More-
over, it is extremely doubtful that any justification could be made for the
use of a formula in the calculation of future conscious pain and suffering
damages. 15 2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court provided additional direction to trial
courts in the calculation of conscious pain and suffering damages in the case
146. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 140-41 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 162.
149. Drexler, 72 Wis. 2d at 430, 241 N.W.2d at 407. "While expert testimony is not essential
to support a finding that an individual suffers pain, the rule is that a medical expert may express
an opinion as to whether the pain of one he has attended or examined is real, imaginary or
feigned." Id.
However, medical expert opinions, based on the subjective statements of pain and suffering by
the plaintiff, are not admissible if only procured for the purposes of testifying on behalf of the
plaintiff. Id. at 431, 241 N.W.2d at 407-08.
150. From a trial practice standpoint, if time and financial resources abound, the testimony of
a medical expert as to the existence and degrees of both past and future pain and suffering would
strengthen one's argument, regardless of one's legal representation. See 1 M. MINZER, supra note
8, § 4.13(1)(b).
151. Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940). In this case, the plaintiff
was conscious for one hour and twenty minutes before his death due to an automobile accident.
The jury's award of $500 for the conscious pain and suffering in this case was considered not
excessive. Id. at 582, 290 N.W. at 198. The court, however, referred to an earlier Wisconsin
Supreme Court opinion which considered $200 per hour for suffering as a sufficient rate of com-
pensation for conscious pain and suffering. Id. (citing Nygaard v. Wadhams Oil Co., 231 Wis.
236, 284 N.W. 577 (1939)).
152. Hamilton, 233 Wis. at 582, 290 N.W. at 204; see also Blaisdell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1
Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W.2d 886 (1957); Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 201 N.W.2d 580 (1972).
1991]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of Helleckson v. Loiselle.53 The court held that the jury should consider
the following factors in evaluating disputed pain and suffering: (1) the du-
ration of the conscious suffering; (2) prior health; (3) whether sedatives and
other drugs were used to relieve pain and whether they were effective; and
(4) whether some pain was attributable to pre-existing physical disorders
and, if so, whether this condition was aggravated by the incident in
question. 154
The court continued to grapple with the policy concerns of nonpecu-
niary pain and suffering damages in Blaisdell v. All State Insurance Co. 5
In one instance, the court reaffirmed the existing law, which identifies the
limited value mathematical formulas provide in the calculation of conscious
pain and suffering. 56 In another instance, the court attempts to apply a
"high/low" system of compensation on a case-by-case basis." 7 In short,
the supreme court's attempts to create and define a mechanism for juries to
calculate conscious pain and suffering damages proved fruitless. The "per
hour rate" and "high/low" systems for calculating conscious pain and suf-
fering damages lacked a consistent abuse of discretion threshold. Trial
judges could decide within a wide latitude of discretion to accept or reject a
jury's award and still be within acceptable discretionary boundaries.
153. 37 Wis. 2d 423, 155 N.W.2d 45 (1967). A pedestrian was struck by an automobile and
died six and one-half days later. Id.
154. Id. at 430, 155 N.W.2d at 50. The court relied, in part, upon the factors to be consid-
ered in the calculation of past and future earning losses as outlined in Ghiardi, see supra note 139,
at 71-72. See also Juiditta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535 (App. Div.
1980) (the award of damages for conscious pain and suffering depends upon the interval between
injury and death, the degree of consciousness, severity of pain, apprehension of impending death,
and the overall duration of all of these factors).
The court directs the jury to consider the use of medication to suppress pain and consciousness
as a factor in determining the degree of pain and suffering damages. Does the plaintiff have a duty
to avoid foreseeable consequences (Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences) by insisting the treating
physician make them unconscious? If a plaintiff is drug induced to produce unconsciousness, is
the plaintiff precluded from conscious pain and suffering damages or any nonpecuniary damages
in jurisdictions that do not recognize recovery for the "loss of enjoyment of life"? See infra notes
192-94 and accompaning text for an overview of "loss of enjoyment of life" damages. See also
infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text for the author's proposed solution to avoid or mini-
mize these legal predicaments.
155. 1 Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W.2d 886 (1957).
156. Id. at 26, 82 N.W.2d at 890.
157. Id. That is, if the evidence of a particular case supports a high compensation amount of
$3,500 and a low compensation amount of $1,500, and the jury award falls within such parame-
ters, then such an award will not be deemed excessive. Id. The court also recognized the effect of
inflation on the dollar's purchasing power and inferred that inflation should be considered in
calculating future conscious pain and suffering damages. Id.
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The court in Affett v. Milwaukee and S. T. Corp. 158 meticulously ex-
amined the arguments for and against the use of mathematical formulas. 159
The court concluded:
There is no mathematical way of formulating a formula which will
represent all the varying factors involved in pain and suffering in a
given case without making assumptions of fact which are not in the
evidence. The formula, rather than being an aid as claimed, would
result in confusing the jury. The basic reasoning behind the use of
any mathematical formula is not so much to aid, or even to per-
suade,... the jury as it is to ultimately establish a fixed standard to
displace the jury's concept of what is a fair and reasonable amount
to compensate for the pain and suffering sustained as shown by the
evidence in the light of the common knowledge and experience pos-
sessed by the jury of the nature of pain and suffering and the value of
money.
6 °
Once again, the court rejected the use of a per diem amount as a means
calculating conscious pain and suffering awards. The court's rationale is
simple and forthright: A mathematical formula would standardize a jury's
approach to compensation for pain and suffering, regardless of the specific
facts of the case. 161
158. 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
159. Arguments supporting a structured approach to damage calculations include the follow-
ing: (1) the court should guide the jury using practical and reasonable considerations; (2) a per
diem argument does not lack an evidentiary foundation because the jury must, by some reasoning
process, arrive at a damage amount that is appropriately tailored to the facts of the case; (3) a
suggested total amount or per diem amount does no more than present one method of reasoning
available to the trier of fact; (4) a per diem argument is not evidence and is only an illustration and
suggestion; and (5) when one counsel has made a suggested damage award, opposing counsel is
equally free to suggest his own amounts based upon the evidence at trial. Id. at 610-11, 106
N.W.2d at 278-79. Less substantive arguments were also summarized by the court. Id.
Arguments in opposition to a formalized method for calculation of damages in Affett were
outlined as follows: (1) there is no evidentiary basis for converting pain and suffering into mone-
tary damages; (2) it is improper for counsel to suggest a total amount of pain and suffering dam-
ages and, therefore, improper to suggest a per diem amount; (3) to allow an attorney to suggest
total damage amounts is tantamount to the attorney giving testimony - opinions and conclusions
not supported by evidence; (4) since juries are frequently mislead, suggested damages would result
in excessive awards; and (5) it is impossible for a defendant to argue against a suggested amount
(or a per diem amount) for such a suggestion has no basis in evidence. Therefore, if the defendant
responds to plaintiff's argument, he/she suffers the same effect of arguing without basis in evi-
dence. If defendant does not respond, such inaction implies approval of the suggested per diem
amount. Id. at 610, 106 N.W.2d at 278.
160. Id. at 612-13, 106 N.W.2d at 279-80.
161. Id., 106 N.W.2d at 279. Such an approach could yield the same jury verdict for the
same injuries in two separate suits. Assume that a pain and suffering award of $50,000 for a
ruptured disc was awarded as the result of a slip and fall accident for plaintiff No. 1 and an award
of $50,000 for plaintiff No. 2 for the same injury in a head-on automobile collision. These two
experiences of pain and suffering are completely different, resulting from two completely different
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Underlying these various approaches in the calculation of pain and suf-
fering damages, the court adheres to the general rule on damages:
In actions sounding in damages merely, where the law furnishes
no legal rule for measuring them, the amount to be awarded rests
largely in the discretion of the jury, and with their verdict the courts
are reluctant to interfere. As shown elsewhere, a verdict may be set
aside as excessive by the trial court or on appeal when, and not un-
less, it is so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption, or it is clear that the jury disre-
garded the evidence or the rules of law....
Since it is for the jury, and not for the court, to fix the amount of
the damages, their verdict in an action for unliquidated damages will
not be set aside merely because it is large or because the reviewing
court would have awarded less. Full compensation is impossible in
the abstract, and different individuals will vary in their estimate of
the sum which will be a just pecuniary compensation. Hence, all that
the court can do is to see that the jury approximates a sane estimate,
or, as it is sometimes said, see the results attained do not shock the
judicial conscience. 62
Even though the "shock[s] the judicial conscience" standard is nebulous
and subjective, it is the only direction the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
provided in determining the reasonableness of damage awards. This stan-
dard implies that the trial court must provide justification in order to over-
turn a jury's award.
An academic examination of pain and suffering damages would perhaps
make a distinction between the proof and the calculation of damages with
the intent to facilitate a greater understanding.16 However, in past or fu-
ture conscious pain and suffering jury awards, proof of such pain and suffer-
ing and the actual calculation method work in unison:
A jury may mistakenly assume (without supporting evidence) that
there have been, or will be certain effects from an injury or fix com-
pensation for sufficiently proved effects of injury at a figure which is
factual patterns. The suffering and trauma associated with each accident could be vastly different,
yet a formula approach would require the same or comparable damage awards. See generally
Graham, Pattern Jury Instructions The Prospect of Over or Undercompensation in Damage Awards
for Personal Injuries, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 33 (1978).
162. Bethke v. Duwe, 256 Wis. 378, 384-85, 41 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1950) (citation omitted);
see also Makowski v. Ehlerback, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 42, 103 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1960).
163. Achieving fairness between a plaintiff and defendant is fraught with difficulty. The
"[t]heoretical nicety [of a calculation method] is impossible." Makowski, 11 Wis. 2d at 41-42, 103
N.W.2d at 910. Our judicial system primarily relies on the good sense of jurors to determine what
amount of money will reasonably compensate an individual for loss of their well-being. Id. at 42,
103 N.W.2d at 910.
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beyond the range of reasonably debatable amounts. In a case where
it is clear to the court that the amount awarded must necessarily
reflect an allowance for the effects of injury not sufficiently proved or
reflect a rate of compensation which is beyond reason, the court will
declare the damages excessive. Where the question is a close one, it
should be resolved in favor of the verdict.'
In short, existing Wisconsin law gives great deference to the jury in its
calculation of conscious pain and suffering damages. 165 Wisconsin courts
have continued to uphold the prohibition of a suggested per diem
amount,1 66 yet have permitted counsel for either party to suggest a dollar
amount for damages in their closing arguments.16 7 The reason for this al-
lowance stems from attorneys' latitude to point out to the jury reasonable
conclusions or inferences based upon the evidence. 61 In addition, it is im-
portant that a jury be given some guidance in determining what dollar
amount would reasonably compensate the claimant. 169 This approach to
jury award calculations is self-policing in the sense that jurors have the abil-
ity to discern reasonable suggestions from absurd ones. 170
C Degrees of Consciousness/Levels of Awareness
In order to recover damages for pain and suffering in Wisconsin, as in
most jurisdictions, the plaintiff is required to be "conscious."' 71 In empha-
sizing the consciousness requirement, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its preference for "conscious pain and suffering" instead of
"personal injury" as the phrase to describe the plaintiff's injuries in jury
164. Id. at 42-43, 103 N.W.2d at 910-11.
165. Bums v. Geres, 140 Wis. 2d 197, 204 n.4, 409 N.W.2d 428, 431 n.4 (1987) (the judicial
system relies on the good sense of jurors in calculating pain and suffering awards) (citing Makow-
ski v. Ehlenback, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 42, 103 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1960)); Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis.
2d 211, 236, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (1980) (because there is no mechanical legal rule for measure-
ment of pain and suffering damages, the damage award rests with the discretion of the jury).
166. Eg., Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hosp., 121 Wis. 2d 531, 361 N.W.2d 297 (Ct.
App. 1984).




170. Id. at 744, 266 N.W.2d at 595. However, if the plaintiff is recovering damages for loss of
society and companionship as the survivor of a wrongful death suit, such a lump sum argument
does not contain self-policing qualities and is, therefore, prohibited. Id. at 745-46, 266 N.W.2d at
595; see generally Minter, Task Force on Tort Reform Research Paper on Limiting Recovery of
Noneconomic Damages 60 Wis. BAR BULL., July 1987, at 15.
171. Schulz v. General Casualty Co., 233 Wis. 118, 288 N.W. 803 (1939). A jury verdict of
$1,000 for pain and suffering was rendered perverse because the decedent was wholly unconscious
after an automobile accident. The supreme court held that it was proper for the trial court to
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instructions.172 The court further refined the concept of conscious pain and
suffering by recognizing "degrees of consciousness" in Blaisdell v. All State
Insurance Co. 173 The Blaisdell court stated that the duration of pain and
suffering, along with "[t]he degree of consciousness, severity of pain, and
apprehension of impending death have all been mentioned as important ele-
ments for consideration" in calculating pain and suffering damages. 74 Ju-
risdictions other than Wisconsin have also recognized "degrees of conscious
pain and suffering" or "levels of awareness" as factors to be considered by
juries.
The New York Appellate Court in Kenavan v. City of New York 17' ac-
knowledged degrees of conscious pain and suffering.' 76 The court held that,
given the expert medical testimony at trial, it was unclear whether the
firefighter experienced pain prior to death:
[T]he expert witness called by his estate testified that (1) there existed
five levels of consciousness which, in ascending order, contained de-
creasing responses to pain, and (2) Kenavan, at the time of his arri-
strike the award from the verdict because the question of pain and suffering should not have been
submitted to the jury. Id. at 128, 288 N.W. at 808.
In order for the plaintiff to recover pain and suffering damages, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving to a reasonable certainty, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that such dam-
ages exist. Czapinski v. Thomas Furniture Co., 158 Wis. 635, 644, 149 N.W. 477, 480 (1914).
172. Blaisdell v. All State Ins. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W.2d 886 (1957). "It would have been
better, we think, to have used the more exact terms.. ." i.e., "'conscious pain and suffering rather
than personal injury."' Id. at 24, 82 N.W.2d at 889. This holding was reatfirmed in Leibl v. St.
Mary's Hosp. of Milwaukee, 57 Wis. 2d 227, 203 N.W.2d 715 (1973).
173. 1 Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W.2d 886 (1957).
174. Id. at 26, 82 N.W.2d at 890. The plaintiff in Blaisdell was a female pedestrian who was
struck by an automobile and died approximately seven hours later. Id. at 20, 82 N.W.2d at 887.
The plaintiff was apparently conscious at the scene of the accident, moaning on occasion and at
times spoke in an irrational manner. Id. at 21, 82 N.W.2d at 888. While at the hospital, the
plaintiff seemed to recognize a relative, continued to moan and requested relief for her pain. Id. at
22, 82 N.W.2d at 888; see also, Juiditta v. Bethleham Steel Corp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d
535 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). "[The interval between injury and death, when the interval is rela-
tively short, the degree of consciousness, severity of pain, apprehension of impending death along
with duration of all elements to be considered" when determing damages from conscious pain and
suffering. Id. at 138, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (citing Tenczar v. Milligan, 47 A.D. 773, 775, 365
N.Y.S.2d, 272, 275 (Ct. App. 1975)).
175. 120 A.D.2d 24, 507 N.Y.S.2d 193 (App. Div. 1986).
176. Id. at 34, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The decedent's estate filed suit against the City of New
York and the driver of the automobile that struck the decedent. The decedent, a former firefighter
for the City, was called to the scene of a burning automobile. While in the process of extinguish-
ing the fire, defendant automobile driver drove into the firefighter, who died approximately
twenty-seven hours later. Id. at 26, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 195. The estate's claim against the City was
for placing the firefighters in a "position of danger and jeopardy." The jury ultimately convicted
the defendant of manslaughter and assault. Id. The appellate court found that there was no
evidence to support the contention that the city was negligent in not removing the abandoned
parked car. Id. at 29, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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val at the hospital, was in "either state 3, possibly early 4" which the
expert defined as follows: "Level 3 is somewhat below that. Now the
individual is unconscious, that is not responsive to the outside
world, but still has a response to pain so that in level 3 a painful
stimulus will invoke a response such as a pinch on the arm, the arm
will be withdrawn. A pinch on the leg or a stick with the needle.
The leg will be withdrawn.An attempt to put a tube down the
mouth, the unconscious patient will try to push it away with his
hand. This is called a response to noxious or painful stimuli. Level
four is one level below this. Now, there is little response to pain but
still some.
177
This expert's position, as adopted by the New York Appellate Court, is that
a patient can experience varying degrees of pain at different levels of con-
sciousness. In other words, the plaintiff's recovery of damages should cor-
respond to the degree of his conscious pain and suffering. 178
New York's highest court revisited the issue of consciousness as it re-
lates to damages for pain and suffering and the loss of enjoyment in McDou-
gald v. Garber.179 The trial court instructed the jury to award pain and
suffering damages only if there is "some level of awareness" on the part of
the plaintiff.i1 0 The McDougald court held that the "some level of aware-
ness" standard established by the trial court was an appropriate instruction
for the jury to follow in all aspects of calculating nonpecuniary losses: 81
No doubt the standard ignores analyticaly relevant levels of cogni-
tion, but we resist the desire for analytical purity in favor of simplic-
ity. A more complex instruction might give the appearance of
177. Id. at 34, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 200. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion of levels of consciousness.
178. In re Jobes, 210 N.J. Super. 543, 510 A.2d 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), afid,
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). The Superior Court's decision supported this proposition. See
infra note 184.
179. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S. 937 (1989). A thirty-one year old woman
underwent a Caesarean section and tubal ligation when she experienced oxygen deprivation result-
ing in a permanent comatose condition. Id. at 251, 536 N.E.2d at 373, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
180. Id. at 253, 536 N.E.2d at 374, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 939. The jury instruction stated:
It is for you to determine the level of Emma McDougald's perception and awareness. Suf-
fering relates primarily to the emotional reaction of the injured person to the injury. Thus,
for an injured person to experience suffering, there, again, must be some level of awareness.
If Emma McDougald is totally unaware of her condition or totally incapable of any emo-
tional reaction, then you cannot award her damages for suffering. If, however, you con-
clude that there is some level of perception or that she is capable of an emotional response
at some level, then damages for pain and suffering should be awarded....
Id.
181. Id. at 255, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
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greater precision but, given the limits of our understanding of the
human mind, it would in reality lead to only greater speculation.182
The McDougald court's distinction, if any, between "levels of cognition"
or "levels of awareness" is not clear from this opinion. The most logical
conclusion is that levels of awareness and cognition are synonymous with
"levels of consciousness" because the denotation of consciousness is an
"awareness of one's environment."183 In contrast to the McDougald analy-
sis, New Jersey courts would allow a plaintiff compensation according to
the pain experienced at each level of awareness/consciousness.
18 4
The South Dakota Supreme Court is less specific in its required jury
instructions on pain and suffering. In Plank v. Heirigs,18 5 the court upheld a
lower court's jury instruction which omitted "conscious" from the pain and
suffering instruction. 8 6 The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
the jury could only have understood the meaning of pain and suffering as
conscious pain and suffering.187
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text concerning the complete definition of
consciousness.
184. The Superior Court of New Jersey alluded to two levels of consciousness in In re Jobes,
210 N.J. Super. 543, 510 A.2d 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). The issue before this New
Jersey court was whether a "life advocate" could be appointed for a woman who was rendered
comatose due to an anethesiologial misadventure. The woman's husband sought to remove his
wife from a life-sustaining food nutrition system. Id. at 544 n.1, 510 A.2d at 134 n.1. However,
the court stated:
[t]he use of "comatose," "unconscious" and "non-cognitive" is not meant to be dispositive
of certain issues which must be decided at the trial; eg., whether Nancy Ellen Jobes is
presently in a vegetative state; what level, if any, of consciousness exists, and whether she
does, in fact, respond in a comprehending sense to external stimuli, such as pain and the
commands of others.
Id.
185. 83 S.D. 173, 156 N.W.2d 193 (1968).
186. Id. at 186, 156 N.W.2d at 201. The plaintiff in Plank v. Heirigs sustained severe brain
injury as a result of a rear end automobile accident. The plaintiff received $18,740.90 for pain and
suffering out of a total of $30,000 in general damages. One of the issues on appeal was whether
the jury was properly instructed regarding conscious pain and suffering. Id. at 186, 156 N.W.2d
at 200. The appellant contended that such an omission resulted in a jury verdict that was based
upon "prejudice, passion, speculation or conjecture." Id. at 185, 156 N.W. 2d at 200-01.
187. Id.
[W]e believe when he instructed that damages may only be awarded for pain experienced,
the jury was in effect told and it could only have understood this to mean conscious pain
for if one is unconscious, he does not experience pain. To experience something is to "meet
with, feel, suffer, (or) undergo" it.
Id. at 186, 156 N.W.2d at 201 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The same court subsequently held that the addition of the word "conscious" to "pain and
suffering" did not impose an improper burden on the plaintiff in their claim for damages. Krumm
v. Feuerhelm, 298 N.W.2d 184, 189 (S.D. 1980).
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In summary, some jurisdictions, such as South Dakota, appear to hold
the jury in high esteem and to believe that "conscious" need not modify
"pain and suffering" in order for the jury to comprehend and fulfill its du-
ties. In contrast, other jurisdictions implicitly believe that the plaintiff can
experience different levels of pain at different levels of consciousness. The
latter belief is contrary to the medical findings as outlined in this Com-
ment. l88 Conscious pain and suffering is an all or nothing proposition. In
short, the danger in a loosely contructed jury instruction on pain and suffer-
ing will undoubtedly result in unjust compensation. 8 9
V. DEGREES OF AWARENESS/CONSCIOUSNESS FOR PAIN AND
SUFFERING DAMAGES SHOULD NOT EXIST
AS A MAT=ER OF LAW
The American jurisprudence system enables an individual who has sus-
tained a bodily injury to receive monetary compensation from the
tortfeasor. 9° When the injured party is rendered unconscious 91 as a result
of another's negligent conduct, such an injured party is entitled to just com-
pensation. This compensation should not be in the form of pain and suffer-
ing damages, but rather in a form of nonpecuniary damages, such as loss of
enjoyment of life.' 92 The adoption of "loss of enjoyment of life" damages as
188. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text for a discussion in interrelationship of pain
and consciousness.
189. See also Cook v. Erwin, 30 A.D.2d 579, 289 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 1968) (movement of
plaintiff's eyes, acknowledgment and acceptance of his last rites, and groaning was sufficent evi-
dence to prove the experience of pain). But see Tenczar v. Milligan, 47 A.D.2d 773, 365 N.Y.S.2d
272 (App. Div. 1975) (plaintiff's moaning and groaning was insufficent evidence to support a
$30,000 conscious pain and suffering award, and was therefore reduced to $10,000).
190. See generally supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text concerning the purposes of the
tort legal system.
The "Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences" or duty to "mitigate damages" is a topic related
to that of damages for conscious pain and suffering. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Helleckson
v. Loiselle, 37 Wis. 2d 423, 155 N.W.2d 45 (1967), held that sedatives and their effects, as well as
other drugs used to relieve pain, are factors that juries should consider when calculating pain and
suffering damages. Id. at 430, 155 N.W.2d at 50. See generally DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF REMEDIES § 8.9, at 579 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 Avoidable Conse-
quences (1977); 2 M. MINzER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD, & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAM-
AGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 16.30-16.35 (1989).
191. The term "unconscious" is used in this context to denote the plaintiff's inability to expe-
rience pain. For a discussion of consciousness from a medical perspective, see supra notes 73-83
and accompanying text.
192. "Loss of enjoyment of life" may consist of the plaintiff's loss of ability to engage in
sports or recreational activities, or in the loss of ability to play with one's children." 22 AM. JUR.
2D Damages § 272, at 222 (1988). Specifically, the plaintiff can seek to prove the following facts
and circumstances to establish damages for loss of enjoyment of life:
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:289
a separate part of the overall nonpecuniary damages is a distinct issue
which exceeds the scope of this Comment.1
93
In evaluating nonpecuniary damages, juries are generally expected to be
objective in examining and weighing all the evidence introduced at trial.
The jury is to arrive at a verdict based upon the evidence as viewed from the
objective position of a "reasonable person."' 94 The requirement that juries
examine the facts of a case objectively is the very reason damages for pain
and suffering are not calculated on a "per hour" basis or "per diem" ba-
Nature of plaintiff's injury and disability caused by it; Impairment of ability to engage in
athletic activities [including] golf, swimming, tennis, roller skating, handball; Impairment
of ability to engage in recreational activities [including] hunting, fishing, reading; Interfer-
ence with family activities [including] picnics, excursions, shopping, caring for children;
Interference with religious activities [including] church attendance; Interference with so-
cial activities [including] dances, parties, playing cards.
Id. § 273, at 222-23. For additional discussion of loss of enjoyment of life, see supra notes 21-29.
193. A number of jurisdictions have accepted the proposition that "loss of enjoyment of life"
is an element of damages distinct from pain and suffering, including Georgia; Maryland; Minne-
sota; Nebraska, New Jersey; Washington; Wisconsin, Bassett v. Milwaukee N. Ry. Co., 169 Wis.
152, 170 N.W. 944 (1919); and Wyoming. In addition, numerous federal courts have also recog-
nized this distinction in application of state law to cases in the following federal district and/or
circuit courts: Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Tennessee. For an extensive list of
citations pertaining to the above-mentioned states, see 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 272, at 221
n.27; see also Annotation, Damage Element - Loss of Enjoyment of Life, 34 A.L.R. 4th 293
(1984); Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAc. L.J. 965
(1981); and C. Hernes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life - Duplication of Damages Versus Full Compen-
sation, 63 N.D.L. Rev. 561 (1987). But see Leiken v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989)
(as a general rule, loss of enjoyment of life is "inextricably included" in damages for pain and
suffering).
When a jurisdiction makes the distinction between damages for pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life, "awareness" of such a loss of enjoyment of life should not be a prerequisite for
the plaintiff's recovery. To hold otherwise is to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to seek just
compensation under long-established tort law. If awareness is adopted as an element, a tortfeasor
would not be liable to the plaintiff for conscious pain and suffering or for the loss of enjoyment of
life when the plaintiff is rendered unconscious. The defendant's liability is limited, which in turn
restricts the plaintiff's opportunity to recover compensatory damages.
However, if recovery for loss of enjoyment of life includes awareness as an element, keeping
jurors within the confines of the jury instructions would be difficult. For example, the defense
counsel in the beating and rape of the Central Park jogger would be required to muster an infinite
amount of creativity to convince a jury that the female investment banker is not entitled to pain
and suffering damages or loss of enjoyment of life, as a matter of law, for the eleven days she was
unconscious. It obviously would be imprudent for defense counsel to argue such a position be-
cause the jury would be incensed given the heinous nature of the crime. The logical solution to
this quandary is to allow the jury to award loss of enjoyment of life damages for those eleven days
without requiring an element of "awareness." Such a solution would justly compensate the vic-
tim, limit the defendant's liability within his duty to compensate, and maintain reasonable control
of, and provide direction to, the jury in deliberations.
194. See generally supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of subjective and
objective jury approaches to awarding damages.
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sis. 195 Juries should not speculate; rather they should base all the factual
findings and damage awards on the evidence submitted at trial.19 6
To that end, courts instruct jurors in an attempt to prevent jury specula-
tion or to help prevent juries from thinking that a person who is semicon-
scious is experiencing pain and suffering and therefore is entitled to a
monetary damage award. When objective medical evidence proves that the
plaintiff's cerebral cortex is not functioning,197 or when objective medical
evidence proves that the plaintiff's brain stem and cerebral cortex are se-
verely damaged,198 the court should not submit the issue of conscious pain
and suffering to the jury as a matter of law because the plaintiff is incapable
of experiencing pain and suffering. When objective medical evidence indi-
cates to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the plaintiff's cerebral
cortex is incapable of perception or that the plaintiff's brain stem is not
properly functioning, in the absence of controverting evidence, the issue of
conscious pain and suffering should not be submitted to the jury as a matter
of law.'99 Such a finding of law would protect the interests of the defend-
ant; i.e., she need only pay her fair share of the damages she has caused.
Moreover, such a finding of law would protect the integrity of the tort sys-
tem. Nonpecuniary compensation for an unconscious plaintiff could origi-
nate from some category of damages other than conscious pain and
suffering, such as loss of enjoyment of life.
When the issue of whether a plaintiff can experience pain at different
degrees of consciousness is specifically addressed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the court will be expected to rule consistently with its holding in
Schulz v. General Casualty Co.2"° The Schulz court held that if the plaintiff
is wholly unconscious, the question of pain and suffering should not be sub-
mitted to the jury.20 1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court could also look to the
New York court's holding in McDougald v. Garber,2 "2 which sought to pro-
vide the jury with simple instructions.
The McDougald court did not expect nor imply that "the fact finder
should sort out varying degrees of cognition and determine at what level a
195. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. The cerebral cortex, specifically the neocortex, is the center of human consciousness.
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of consciousness.
198. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. Schulz v. General Casualty Co., 233 Wis. 118, 288 N.W. 803 (1939) rev'd in part on
other grounds, Peot v. Ferroro, 83 Wis. 2d 727, 727, 286 N.W.2d 586, 587 (1978).
201. Schulz, 233 Wis. at 128-29, 288 N.W. at 808. See also supra note 180 and accompanying
text.
202. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989).
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particular deprivation can be fully appreciated. '20 3 The experience of pain
is stimulus, perception, and effect.204 The existence of these three elements
in a tort action for pain and suffering damages (excluding psychogenic pain
and suffering)20 5 entitles the plaintiff to economic damages for the negligent
conduct of another. In the absence of any one of these three elements of
pain and suffering, the plaintiff should not be able to seek nonpecuniary
damages from the "conscious pain and suffering" category of damages be-
cause the harm, the experience of pain, is absent.
VII. CONCLUSION
The narrow scope of this Comment touches upon a wide range of tort
topics. Its intent is to provide a simplified understanding of the complex
interworkings of the human brain and nervous system to the extent neces-
sary to fulfill its purpose. The purpose of this Comment is to point out that
existing tort law does not reflect medical realities. That is, when certain
pathogenic conditions within the human body exist, it is impossible for a
human to experience pain. Courts should not submit the issue of conscious
pain and suffering to juries for deliberation as a matter of law when such
conditions exist. Moreover, the medical profession is in agreement to a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty that, though there are levels or degrees
of consciousness, there are only limited levels or degrees at which one can
experience pain. One can experience pain only when the brain's center of
cognition and perception (neocortex) is functioning. Any human being in a
condition short of the ability to perceive her environment should not be
entitled to conscious pain and suffering damages. Other existing tort dam-
ages are available to compensate the injured party for their loss or harm.
The bases for damages for conscious pain and suffering lie within the
principles of tort law: to compensate plaintiffs for pain and suffering if, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, such pain and suffering exists. In-
structing the jury to calculate pain and suffering damages in light of "de-
grees of consciousness" is to ask the jury to speculate on the compensatory
value of conscious pain and suffering that the plaintiff has not experienced.
203. Id. at 255, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940; see also supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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